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Abstract
In this paper we propose creative destruction as the channel for ination to
impact long-run growth. This is possible because ination may a¤ect the relative
amount of resources allocated to entrepreneurs. The banks can reap revenue from
a higher rate of credit growth (like seigniorage revenue), which attracts more labor
into banks, decreasing the prot of entrepreneurs and thereby growth. But when
the revenue is achieved by issuing more credit to entrepreneurs, part of the revenue
goes to entrepreneurs, attracting more resources into R&D and promoting growth.
When banks retain a larger share of the revenue, the former e¤ect dominates and
credit ination retards growth. When entrepreneurs get the larger share of the
revenue, the latter e¤ect dominates and credit ination increases growth. When the
revenue is achieved by issuing more consumptive credit, growth will be retarded.
The welfare implications are also analyzed. Empirical evidence from the U.S. and
China is also provided.
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Only the entrepreneur then, in principle, needs credit; only for industrial development
does it play a fundamental part,...Schumpeter (1911, p. 105)
1 Introduction
A continuing large literature assesses how ination a¤ects economic growth. Originally
authors use a neoclassical setting (e.g., Tobin, 1965; Sidrauski, 1967; Stockman, 1981).
Recent studies often use an endogenous growth framework (e.g., Jones and Manuelli, 1995;
Ireland, 1994), but the source of growth there is not from deliberate entrepreneursinno-
vations as in the new growth models (hereafter NGM) (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt,
1992). In this paper we study how ination a¤ects growth in the NGM. This alternative
approach is important for two reasons. First, how ination a¤ects creative destruction
(the source of long-run growth) has received far less attention. Second, in reality ination
may a¤ect the amount of resources allocated to entrepreneurs. Consequently, creative
destruction may be one important channel for ination to impact long-run growth.
The banking sector in NGM plays a passive role. The growth rate of credit supply
equals that of output produced (like a Friedmans k-percent rule), keeping the price level
constant detailed later. In reality, the limit of credit creation by banks is a puzzling
issue (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, ch. 4; Schumpeter, 113-115). Recently authors argue
that the credit creation by nancial intermediaries contributes to the subprime-mortgage
crisis (e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009). Therefore, it is very likely that the banks, for their own
rational self-interest, may raise the growth rate of credit supply. This makes it important
to study how credit ination impacts long-run growth via its e¤ect on creative destruction.
While we leave the detailed discussion of the data to Section 4.4, we show that there
are large variations in the relative share of resources, either employment or total wages,
allocated to the nancial sector (see Figures 1 to 4). Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the e¤ects of
decreasing federal funds rates of the U.S. during 2001-2003 on the employment share, total
compensation share and the relative compensation of the nancial sector (i.e., the Finance
and Insurance Industries classied by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)). One can
observe that the expansionary monetary policy in the U.S. has initially caused an increase
in the share of employees in the nancial sector. As the federal funds rate increases since
2003, the share stays roughly constant during 2003-2006. Although the employment
share of the nancial sector remains constant, its relative compensation, as shown in
Figure 2, increases rapidly, ending up with an increasing share of total compensation of
the nancial sector in all industries. In each year during 2003-2006, an additional 0.5%
of total compensation in the U.S. has been absorbed into the nancial sector.
[Figures 1 to 4 Here]
As China greatly felt the negative impact of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008,
Premier Wen Jiabao decided to pump 4,000 billion Yuan (the Chinese currency) into the
1
economy starting from 2009. As illustrated in Figure 3, there was a large increase in the
growth rate of M2 in 2009. Before 2009, Chinas M2 growth was relatively stable. Also
shown in Figure 3, the employment share of the nancial sector increased 0.3 percentage
points in 2009 comparing to 2007. The increasing employment share coupled with the
increasing relative wage of the nancial sector (see Figure 4) caused the continuing increase
of the share of total wages of the nancial sector in all industries, despite of the adversity
brought in by the subprime mortgage crisis. These important real world facts highlight
the importance of the mechanism that we try to formalize in our paper  the relative
amount of resources allocated to entrepreneurs and thereby creative destruction.
Before we get to the dry details, we present the ndings. The banks can reap revenue
from a higher rate of credit growth (like seigniorage revenue). When the revenue is
achieved by issuing more credit to entrepreneurs, part of the revenue goes to entrepreneurs,
attracting more resources into R&D and promoting growth. The remaining revenue to
banks attracts more labor into banking business, decreasing the prot of entrepreneurs
and thereby growth. When banks retain a larger share of the revenue, the latter e¤ect
dominates and credit ination retards growth. When entrepreneurs get the larger share
of the revenue, the former e¤ect dominates and credit ination increases growth. When
the revenue is achieved by issuing more consumptive credit, growth will be retarded. The
welfare implications and other results are discussed later.
Our approach builds on the seminal work of Schumpeter (1911) on creative destruction
that explains the long-run productivity growth in capitalist society, which is modeled by
Aghion and Howitt (1992). We introduce banks into Aghion and Howitt (1992).1 To
avoid further confusion, we study a pure credit economy as studied by Wicksell (1907).
That is, we abstract from at money and all transactions are nanced by bank credits (see
Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, ch. 4). The price level would be determined by the nominal
quantity of credit over the real output produced. In the pure credit economy, the credit
is equivalent to money. Therefore, the credit means of payment is like a pure lump-sum
transfer of newly-printed at money to the entrepreneurs. Therefore, our analysis holds
with credit wholly replaced by at money or other forms of credit. However, as in
real society, only banks grant credit to the entrepreneurs. Government and the central
bank never issues new money at the disposal of entrepreneurs. Therefore, credit is special
because of the institutional feature of capitalist society. This supports the opening quote
from Schumpeter. Therefore, we abstract from money. Moreover, unlike in the previous
literature in which the source of ination comes from monetary growth, which is controlled
by the central bank, the source of ination in our model comes from credit expansion,
which is realized by the commercial banks.
All innovations are nanced by the credit borrowed from the banks. Each bank needs
only a xed amount of labor to operate. There is free entry into the banking services.
1For other ways to build banks and credit into the economy, please see Gertler et al. (2011).
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Creative destruction is achieved if the banks issue credit means of payment to the en-
trepreneurs to achieve the withdrawal of old uses of resources into new uses. Therefore,
the role of credit is two-fold. First, it has an intertemporal role of nancing entrepre-
neursinnovations that determines long-run growth, as highlighted by Schumpeter (1911)
in the opening quote. This intertemporal role of credit is similar to that of money in
overlapping-generations models (e.g., Samuelson, 1958). The di¤erence is that credit is
used to nance entrepreneurs rather than purchase existing goods. Second, as entrepre-
neurs use the borrowed credit to purchase existing goods (as inputs for innovation and
production), the role of credit is the same as that of money in the exchange economy the
medium of exchange that has been studied in the monetary economics literature (e.g.,
Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989; 1993). As shown by Schumpeter, when entrepreneurs use the
newly created credit to purchase inputs, the price level would temporarily increase. But
after innovations are out, more output can be produced with the same amount of inputs,
hence the price level falls to the previous level. Therefore, the rate of credit ination
would be zero on the balanced growth path.
The question is that the banks have the tendency to increase the rate of credit ina-
tion (as pointed out by Schumpeter, p. 113 and Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, ch. 4).
This is because the increase in credit will generate revenue (like seigniorage-revenue, see
Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, ch. 4; Cagan, 1956; Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1996, ch. 8)
for the rational self-interested banks. Without a demand function for credit, it is hard
to pin down a unique rate of credit ination (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, ch. 4;
Schumpeter, p. 115). To set a limit for the banks to create new credit, we follow Bac-
chetta and Wincoop (2006) to assume that production depends on real credit holding.
This yields a demand for real credit without making it a function of consumption as in
money-in-utility models. This ensures analytical solutions. In a no-bubble equilibrium,
higher credit ination would cause lower demand for real credit, acting as a penalty on
the banks to issue more credit. We prove that there is an optimal revenue-maximizing
rate of credit ination that is positive, dynamically consistent, and uniquely pinned down
by the semi-elasticity of real credit demand with respect to credit ination.
When the revenue is achieved by issuing more credit to entrepreneurs, part of the
revenue goes to entrepreneurs. Otherwise entrepreneurs would only borrow the amount
in the benchmark case that yields zero rate of credit ination. The main ndings are
already presented. That is, credit is not super neutral, and creative destruction is the
channel via which ination a¤ects long-run growth. This complements previous channels
like capital accumulation (Stockman, 1981) and intertemporal labor supply (Gomme,
1993; Jones and Manuelli, 1995). The welfare implications are as follows.
In the creative destruction model of Aghion and Howitt, the welfare-maximizing rate
of growth may be greater or smaller than laissez-faire economys growth (see Aghion
and Howitt, 1998, 61-63 for details). When the laissez-faire growth is excessive (due to
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excessive research when the business-stealing e¤ect dominates), a lower rate of laissez-faire
growth resulted from credit ination (when the share of entrepreneurs is low) is actually
welfare-improving. In contrast, a higher rate of laissez-faire growth generated by credit
ination (when the share of banks is low) is welfare-improving only when the laissez-faire
growth is less than optimal (due to too little research when the intertemporal-spillover
and appropriability e¤ects dominate).
Other results on comparative statics are as follows. The higher the semi-elasticity of
credit demand with respect to credit ination, the lower the rate of credit ination and
the lower the revenue from credit ination. Therefore, a higher semi-elasticity of credit
demand with respect to credit ination would be associated with higher (lower) growth if
the banks have a higher (low) share in the revenue. Moreover, a higher share of banks in
the revenue would always lower growth. Therefore, underlying cross-country di¤erences
in primitives such as the semi-elasticity of credit demand with respect to credit ination
and the relative bargaining power of the banks with respect to the entrepreneurs in credit
contract would govern the relationship between credit ination and long-run growth. This
not only helps to solve the debate in the empirical ination-growth nexus literature,2 but
o¤ers one explanation for the observed substantial country-level growth di¤erentials.3
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the benchmark model. Section 3
introduces credit ination. Section 4 presents some discussions and the empirical evidence.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
The basic model is based on Aghion and Howitt (1992; 1998, ch. 2). The economy is
populated by a continuous mass L of individuals with linear intertemporal preferences:
u (c) =
R1
0
ce
 rd , where c is real consumption at period  ; r is the rate of time
preference, which is also equal to the interest rate. Each individual is endowed with one
unit of labor. Therefore, L is also equal to the aggregate labor supply. In the economy,
the xed stock of labor has three uses. First, some labor is used in manufacturing (that is,
in producing intermediate goods). Second, some labor is used as research input. Third,
some labor is used as the only input for the banks. The rst two uses are the same as in
Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 2). The third use is new, as discussed below.
2Many empirical studies since the 1980s nd a negative e¤ect of ination on growth (e.g., Kormendi
and Meguire, 1985), but there are critics of the ndings. For instance, Khan and Senhadji (2001) have
identied a threshold e¤ect in the ination-growth nexus. Barro (1995) nds that there is no relationship
between pooled decade averages of growth and ination in economies with annual ination below 15%.
Bruno and Easterly (1996) nd that the results are sensitive and depend on outliers with episodes of high
ination. Fischer (1993) nds that, above the threshold, the negative relationship between growth and
ination is signicantly non-linear.
3Previous studies on explaining the cross-country growth di¤erentials include Hall and Jones (1999)
and Aghion and Howitt (2006).
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Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 2) abstract from considering the banking system. They,
of course, implicitly assume there is a perfect nancial system functioning in the back-
ground. We explicitly introduce the banking system into their model. Each bank needs
only a xed amount of labor, l, with 0 < l < L, to operate. This concurs with the agency
cost introduced into endogenous models by King and Levine (1993). Aghion and Howitt
(1998, ch. 2) criticize that it is trivial to consider the agency cost from a banking sector
in endogenous growth models. Nevertheless, we will see that, in Section 3 in which credit
ination is considered, explicitly studying the banking sector is non-trivial.
The nal output is only used for consumption. As discussed, the limit of credit creation
by banks is a puzzling issue (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, ch. 4; Schumpeter, 113-115).
To set a limit for the banks to create new credit, we need a demand function for real credit
that would impose a penalty for the banks to increase the growth rate of credit supply. To
get a demand function for real credit, we follow Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006) to assume
that the production of nal output depends on real credit holding. This avoids making
real demand for credit a function of consumption as in money-in-utility models, which
ensures analytical solutions. Nonetheless, the general results are expected to hold with
credit-in-utility preferences. Following Bacchetta and Wincoop, the production function
for the nal output is
Yt = Atx

t  mt 1 (ln (mt 1)  1) =; (1)
which shows that nal output production depends on the input of an intermediate good,
xt, and the real credit holding associated with the (t  1)th innovation, mt 1. The real
credit holding equals nominal credit holding Mdt 1 divided by the price level Pt 1. In
(credit market) equilibrium, it would equal the nominal credit supply M st 1 divided by
the price level Pt 1 (i.e.,Mdt 1=Pt 1 =M
s
t 1=Pt 1). And  > 0measures the semi-elasticity
of real credit holding with respect to credit ination as shown later. At is the productivity
level associated with xt, and 0 <  < 1. Each innovation (detailed in Section 2.4) is an
invention of a better quality of the intermediate good that replaces the old one. The use
of the new intermediate good raises the technology parameter, At, by the constant factor,
 > 1 (i.e., At+1
At
= ) (the quality ladder).
It is worth discussing the production function in equation (1). Bacchetta and Wincoop
assume the money-in-production function to simplify their model, without o¤ering details
on the relationship between money and production. Since we focus more on credit in
growth models that emphasize analytical solutions, understanding such relationship would
be helpful. If we take the derivative of output Yt with respect to mt 1, we get
@Yt
@mt 1
=   ln (mt 1)

> 0, with mt 1 2 (0; 1) .
That is, when the level of real credit holding lies in the range (0; 1), holding more
credit is good for production. Therefore, the way of introducing credit via the money-in-
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production function is similar to introducing money via the money-in-utility models in the
sense that holding money/credit would be good for the agent, be it for the producer or for
the consumer. Of course there is cost of holding money/credit, which would be the lost
interest earnings from saving the same amount of money/credit in nancial intermediaries
(which applies to both the money-in-utility models and our model here), which will be
pinned down in Section 3.2.1.
Will the the level of real credit holding be in the range (0; 1)? In Section 3.2.2 that
studies the market clearing of the credit market, we will prove that the equilibrium level
of real credit holding in the economy would be pinned down by equation (15). This fact
ensures that the equilibrium level of real credit holding lies in the range (0; 1).
2.1 The Final Output Sector
Given the production function in equation (1), the nal output producer takes the price
charged by intermediate good rms, pt, as given, and chooses her demand for the in-
termediate good, xt, to maximize her prot. Therefore, we have the demand for the
intermediate good: xt =

At
pt
 1
1 
, which yields a prot for the nal goods producer
as t =
 
1

  1 ptxt   mt 1 (ln (mt 1)  1) =. This prot is neglected in Aghion and
Howitts model. In our pure credit economy, the monopolistic prot of nal good pro-
ducer will be distributed to the workers. The mechanism is described in Section 2.7.
2.2 The Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector is also referred to as the manufacturing sector. The tech-
nology of the intermediate goods sector is that it can transform one unit of labor into
one unit of intermediate good. That is, by employing lt units of labor, the manufacturing
sector can produce xt units of intermediate good, with xt = lt. Then the intermediate
good producer takes as given the demand xt by the nal good sector and the wage rate
(Wt), and chooses her price charged on the nal good sector, pt:
Max
Pt
: t = ptxt  Wtlt = ptxt  Wtxt
s:t: xt =

At
pt
 1
1 
Therefore, we have the optimal price mark-up as 1

. The optimal price set by the
manufacturing sector is pt = 1Wt, which yields the monopolistic prot for each successful
innovation (i.e., for the owner of each new intermediate good) as
t =

1

  1

Wtxt = At

1

  1

!txt (2)
where !t = WtAt is the productivity-adjusted wage rate.
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The intermediate goods sector is owned by a monopolistic entrepreneur who sells the
intermediate good to the nal good sector at price pt. But rst the entrepreneur has to
borrow the credit from a bank to purchase the means of production (i.e., to nance the
wage bills of their workers, the Wtlt) and to nance innovation (i.e., the research input).
2.3 The Banking Sector
Schumpeter argues: Credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose
of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of existing purchasing
power. If credit is created and placed at the disposal of entrepreneurs, then creative
destruction is achieved. Therefore, without a properly functioning banking system, cre-
ative destructions will be very hard to achieve. Following Schumpeter, we consider the
leading case in which there are no deposit-reserve regulations for the commercial banks
(see Schumpeter, p. 112). The existence of those regulations may weaken our predictions,
but we expect the main results to hold up.
We assume that there is free entry into the banking business. The case of no free entry
would be analyzed in Section 4.1. Since we are incorporating the banking sector into the
Aghion and Howitt (1992) model, we study the simplest case where there is only one bank
in equilibrium with free entry into the banking business. The credit contract between the
bank and the entrepreneurs would be as follows. The entrepreneurs borrow newly-issued
credit from the banks in the amount of ptxt = 1Wtxt. In so doing, the entrepreneurs have
to pay the service of the banks in the amount of d.
In a mobile labor market, the wage rate of those who work in the bank should equal
that of those who are employed by the manufacturing sector. In the benchmark case with
free entry into the banking business, we have
d = Wtl, (3)
which means the amount of service payment by entrepreneurs to the banks would equal
the wage bills of the workers in the bank. This would leave the banking business zero
prot under free entry.
Therefore, the entrepreneursnet monopolistic prot would be the monopolistic prot
from selling intermediate goods less the service payment to the banks. Therefore, using
equations (2) and (3), the net prot of entrepreneurs is
bt =  1

  1

Wtxt   d = At!t

1

  1

xt   l

: (4)
where !t = WtAt is the productivity-adjusted wage rate. According to equation (4), the
monopolistic prot from each innovation becomes lower comparing to that without the
presence of a banking system. This, not against our intuition, is what is going on in the
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real world. A banking system makes creative destruction possible, but the economy has
to cover the cost of nancial intermediation.
2.4 R&D
We denote the amount of labor used in research as nt. Following Aghion and Howitt
(1998, ch. 2), when the amount nt is used in research, innovation arrives randomly with
a Poisson arrival rate nt, where  > 0 is a parameter indicating the productivity of
the research technology. As in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 2), the research sector is
portrayed as in the patent-race literature. The amount of labor devoted to research (nt)
is determined by the research-arbitrage condition:
Wt = Vt+1; (5)
where t is not time but the number of innovations that have occurred so far, Wt the
research cost, and Vt+1 the discounted expected payo¤ to the (t+ 1)
th innovation. Equa-
tion (5) states that value of working in the manufacturing sector should equal the value
in research in a mobile labor market.
The value Vt+1 is determined by the following asset equation:
rVt+1 = bt+1   nt+1Vt+1,
which yields
Vt+1 =
bt+1
r + nt+1
. (6)
Now combining equations (4), (5), and (6) yields
!t =
!t+1
 
1

  1 xt+1   l
r + nt+1
. (7)
Equation (7) will be combined with labor market clearing condition to pin down the
optimal amount of research, n, in the steady state.
2.5 The Labor Market
As already stated, all labor is used in manufacturing, research and banking. Therefore,
we have the labor market clearing condition as
x+ n+ l = L. (8)
2.6 The Steady-State Growth Rate
Now it is time for us to rule out the bubble solution to make sure the credit issued by the
banks would be accepted by everyone (see the detailed discussion on bubble in Obstfeld
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and Rogo¤, 1996, ch.8). The existence of credit granted by the banks still depends on
peoples expectations. If no one would accept the credit, the entrepreneurs would not be
able to hire the workers with the borrowed credit from the banks. This is because the
workers would not accept the credit as wage because they cannot buy nal consumption
with the credit if no one accepts credit. We would revert to a commodity economy.
Throughout this paper, we assume a no-bubble solution. In so doing, one can show
that the economy would have a steady state in which the consumption, the real credit
holding, the nal output, and the nominal wage would grow at the same rate. Moreover,
the real credit holding would be a constant fraction of the nal output produced (see
Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, ch. 4; Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1996, ch.8). In the following we
will use the equilibrium conditions.
To get the expression for the average growth rate in the steady state, we plug equation
(8) into equation (7):
1 =

 
1

  1  L  n  l  l
r + n
. (9)
Equation (9) pins down the optimal amount of research n in steady state. As shown
in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 2), the growth rate of social knowledge is governed by

At
At
= nt ln . (10)
In a steady state, the consumption, the real credit holding, the nal output, and the
nominal wage would grow at the same rate g = n ln  (the steady state growth rate).
2.7 The Price Level in the Steady-State
Figure 5 helps to illustrate the mechanism. One can see that the capitalist society builds
on the trust from credit. In Figure 5, the solid lines are the ows of credit, while the
dashed lines represent the ow of real goods and services. Each period the bank grants
the credit/loan in the amount of ptxt to the entrepreneur who has to repay the bank in the
amount of its operating cost, Wtl. The entrepreneurs use the credit to hire workers at the
wage rate Wt. Since the production function of the intermediate good is xt = lt, the total
wage bill is Wtlt = Wtxt. Given the mark-up pricing in Section 2.2 of the intermediate
goods rm, we have its sales value ptxt = 1Wtlt. Therefore, the monopolistic prot is t = 
1

  1Wtlt. After repaying the bank in the amount of Wtl, the remaining monopolistic
prot bt =   1   1Wtlt  Wtl would be used in research. That is, the entrepreneurs use
this amount to hire the R&D input, which is labor. Then the researcher would generate
new innovations that follow the Poisson process as discussed above. Now, the total credit
in the economy is still in the amount of ptxt.
The nal good rm has to buy intermediate good in the amount of ptxt (see Section
2.1). Then it produces nal output in the amount of Y = Atxt  mt 1 (ln (mt 1)  1) == 1ptxt 
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mt 1 (ln (mt 1)  1) =. In a no-bubble solution, the real credit holding (m) is a constant
fraction (denoted by ) of the nal output (Y ) produced as discussed in Section 2.6:
m = Y . (11)
Using equation (11) and the constant steady state growth rate of nal output g =
n ln , we can solve for Y = 1

ptxt=

1 +  ln+tn ln  1


. The real nal output produced
is roughly a constant fraction of 1

ptxt given that pt grows at an exponential rate of g in
steady state and the denominator grows at a linear rate of g. Therefore, the real nal
output here will also grow at the rate of nominal wage, given that ptxt = 1Wtlt. The
nal goods rm has a prot in the amount of t =
 
1

  1 ptxt mt 1 (ln (mt 1)  1) =.
To simplify discussion, in the representative agent framework, we assume that the bank
issues the amount of t credit to the representative worker who would spend the credit
together with their wage bills in purchasing nal goods for consumption. This mechanism
allows the representative workers to own the prot of the nal goods producer.
To determine the price level, one can think this way. The total amount of bank credit
in the economy includes the credit granted to the entrepreneurs (ptxt) and that transferred
to the workers (t). The whole credit is 1ptxt mt 1 (ln (mt 1)  1) =. The nal output
is Y = Atxt  mt 1 (ln (mt 1)  1) =. Therefore, the price level (Pt) is 1.
One can also determine the price level by studying the nal goods rm. The order
of the nal goods rm (the credit paid to the nal goods rm) includes that from the
workers in the amount of Wt
 
lt + l

+t and that from the entrepreneurs in the amount
of bt =   1   1Wtlt  Wtl. Given that ptxt = 1Wtlt, the total order/credit received is
Wtlt+t+
 
1

  1Wtlt=t+ 1Wtlt= 1ptxt mt 1 (ln (mt 1)  1) =. The last equality uses
the denition for t. The nal output is Y = Atxt  mt 1 (ln (mt 1)  1) =. Therefore,
the price level Pt in the economy is 1 because 1ptxt = Atx

t .
[Figure 5 Here]
In is worth noting that, each period both the amount of credit granted to the en-
trepreneurs and that transferred to the households grow at the rate of the steady state
growth. Here the price level of 1 is just normalization. The basic idea is that the growth
rate of credit supply equals that of the output produced, keeping the price level constant
in steady state (the price level may temporarily increase before innovations are realized).
3 The Model with Credit Ination
By studying a pure credit economy with a banking sector, we link the credit/monetary
side with the real economy. In so doing, we can model credit ination and study its e¤ect
on creative destruction and thereby long-run growth.
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3.1 Credit Ination Initiated by the Banking Sector
As shown above, the creative destruction is made possible by the banking sector. However,
what amount of credit will the bank create in a laissez-faire economy? The unlimited
power of the banks to create circulating media has been repeatedly quoted especially
when there are no other legal barriers and rules for the gestation of banking business
(Schumpeter, 1911, p. 115). Moreover, it is not clear whether the legal restrictions and
safety-valves are actually su¢ cient in practice to prevent the banks from issuing more
credit. Some researchers have argued that the credit creation by nancial intermediaries
contributes to this recent subprime-mortgage crisis (e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009).
Therefore, it is very likely that the banks, for their own rational self-interest, may
raise the growth rate of credit supply. Suppose the banks issue credit to entrepreneurs
in the amount more than that in the benchmark case in Section 2.3. This would yield
revenue detailed below. As long as the banks can reap part of the revenue, the rational
self-interest banks would initiate credit ination.
For simplicity, we study the limit of the creation of purchasing power by the banks
when there are no legal barriers and rules for the gestation of banking business. Here we
focus on the issuing of credit means of payment the credit issued to entrepreneurs. The
credit ination from issuing more consumptive credit will be discussed in Section 4.2.
3.1.1 Nash Bargaining
We assume that the banks are symmetric and can coordinate without any cost (which is
not very hard given the small number of giant commercial banks in capitalist society).
Now suppose the banks (collectively) issue credit means of payment to entrepreneurs in
the amount more than that in the benchmark case in Section 2.3, and this credit ination
would yield revenue in the amount of R detailed in Section 3.2.
Since our general results do not depend on the specic sharing rule between the banks
and the entrepreneurs, we, for simplicity, assume that the banks and the entrepreneurs
share the revenue from credit ination using a costless Nash bargaining rule. In Nash
bargaining, the bargaining power of the banks is , and that of the entrepreneurs is
(1  ), where  is exogenously given. In the Nash bargaining, their reservation payo¤s
in sharing the revenue from credit ination would be d (in equation 3) and zero for the
banks and the entrepreneurs respectively in the benchmark case in Section 2.3.
With symmetry and no coordination cost, the whole revenue of the banks should be the
same as that of a single giant bank. Now the single giant bank asks for the service payment
in a higher amount D. Therefore, the banks and the entrepreneurs jointly maximize
(D   d) (E)1 
s:t: (D   d) + E = R.
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where R is the credit-ination-revenue (solved later), and E is the amount of credit-
ination-revenue that goes to the entrepreneurs. The Nash bargaining solution is
(D   d) =  R (12)
E = (1  ) R. (13)
The Nash bargaining solution states that the banking business gets  share of the
credit-ination-revenue (R) and the entrepreneurs gets the remaining. The banks will use
the revenue from credit ination to employ more workers, while the entrepreneurs would
use the revenue from credit ination to conduct more R&D.
3.2 The Dynamically Consistent Rate of Credit Ination
Now we try to pin down the optimal rate of credit ination for the banks.
To make things easier to grasp, we refer to Figure 6. The di¤erence between Figure 5
and Figure 6 is that, now the banks issues more credit to the entrepreneurs, shown with
thicker solid line in Figure 6. Suppose the rate of credit ination is  (determined later).
In a no-bubble solution, in steady state we have (1 + ) = M
s

Ms 1
= P
P 1
. In contrast, the
price level remains constant in the benchmark model without credit ination.
[Figure 6 Here]
The revenue from credit ination in period  is fundamentally like seigniorage revenue
(see Cagan, 1956; Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1996, ch. 8) on the whole economy. Denote the
revenue from credit ination in period  as R , we have
R =
M s  M s 1
P
=
M s  M s 1
M s
M s
P
, (14)
where M s stands for the nominal amount of credit supplied by banks.
Since credit ination would yield positive revenue for the banks, what is the limit for
the banks in increasing the rate of credit ination? It is a puzzling issue according to
Schumpeter (1911, p. 115) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch. 4). To set the limit for
the banks in increasing the rate of credit ination, we need to have a demand function
for credit that would impose a penalty on the banks to issue more credit.
3.2.1 The Demand for Credit
We denote the wealth of workers as w . As in Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006), we assume
the wealth yields a nominal return i . At time  + 1 the representative worker receives
the return on their investments plus income y+1 from time  +1 nal output production.
Therefore, the budget constraint for a worker would be
c+1 = (1 + i) (w  m ) +m + y+1
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where c+1 is the workers real consumption, w the wealth of workers, m the real credit
demand/holding. Since the representative workers preference is linear in consumption,
her maximization problem would be maximizing c+1:
max
m
c+1 = (1 + i)w   im + A+1x+1  m (ln (m )  1) =,
where we use equation (1). The above equation states that real credit holding is essential
for the production of nal output, but holding real credit incurs a loss of nominal return
for the representative agent. The rst-order condition for real credit demand is
m =
Md
P
= exp ( i ) , (15)
where Md is the nominal demand of credit, which equals the nominal supply of credit
(M s ) in equilibrium. According to equation (15), the real demand for credit only depends
on the nominal return i . That is why we follow Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006) to assume
that production depends on real credit holding. In so doing, the demand for real credit
is not a function of consumption as in money-in-utility models. This ensures analytical
solutions. In a no-bubble equilibrium, higher credit ination would cause lower demand
for real credit, acting as a penalty on the banks to issue more credit. Therefore, the
existence of the demand function for real credit in equation (15) allows us to pin down
the optimal rate of credit ination chosen by the banks.
3.2.2 The Dynamically-Consistent Rate of Credit Ination
In equilibrium, the credit market clears. That is,
M s
P
=
Md
P
=
M
P
= m .
where m is real credit holding. Given the sher equation (1 + i ) = (1 + r)
P+1
P
, we
have i = r+ . Using the real credit demand in equation (15), we have
Ms
P
= M
d

P
=
exp (  (r + )). Therefore,  is the semi-elasticity of real credit demand with respect to
credit ination. Now the revenue from credit ination in period  (R ) in equation (14)
becomes
R =

1 + 
exp (  (r + )) .
Maximizing R with respect to  yields the rst-order condition
2 +   1 = 0. (16)
This gives two optimal rates of credit ination: one is positive and the other is negative.
Suppose  is chosen in steady state. That is,  is dynamically consistent. In the
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steady state, using equation (14), the revenue from credit ination to the banking sector
in equation (12) becomes
R = 

1 + 
M
P
= 

1 + 
Y , (17)
where the last equality uses the fact that, in a no-bubble equilibrium, the real credit
holding

M
P

is a constant fraction (denoted by ) of the nal output (Y ) produced,
using equation (11). Although we use the same notation Y , the level of technology A
(and its growth rate) would be di¤erent from Section 2 (we use bY in Figure 6).
Nonetheless, one can see that the revenue from credit ination is proportional to the
real output produced in the economy. In a no-bubble solution, Y would grow at the rate
of g (the steady state growth rate) in steady state. Suppose we begin at time 0 in a
dynamically consistent situation. Given the constant rate of time preference r that equals
the interest rate, the banks would get a discounted life-time revenue from credit ination
as
P1
0
(1+g)
(1+r)
 

1+y0 =
1+r
r g

1+y0, where y0 is a constant.
In a dynamically inconsistent situation, the banks would let  go to innity, in which
case the banks can get one-period revenue from credit ination. In the following periods,
people would not accept credit and we revert to a commodity economy and growth is
terminated. In this case, the revenue from credit ination that the banks can get is 
share of the total amount of output at period 0, A0
 
L  l.
Therefore, as long as 1+r
r g

1+y0 > A0
 
L  l, the banks would always choose ,
which is dynamically consistent in steady state. In the following, we assume this inequality
holds. Otherwise we revert to a commodity economy. Therefore, only a positive rate of
credit ination can be dynamically consistent. Therefore, we end up with one rate of
credit ination in the steady state, the positive root to equation (16), denoted by :
 =
  +
p
2 + 4
2
;with
@
@
< 0. (18)
For example,  = 10 as in Bacchetta andWincoop (2006),  = 9%;  = 20,  = 4:8%;
 = 40,  = 2:4%. A larger  will yield a lower rate of credit ination. This is because
a higher  means a larger elasticity of real credit demand with respect to credit ination,
yielding a larger penalty for the banks to issue more credit. Therefore, a lower rate of
credit ination would be optimal.
The existence of a demand function for real credit imposes a limit for the banks in
choosing the rate of credit ination. Without such a micro-founded mechanism, the banks
would have unlimited power to create circulating media as pointed out by Schumpeter
(1911, ch. III, p. 115): Just as the state, under certain circumstances, can print notes
without any assignable limit, so the banks could do likewise if the state  for it comes
to this  were to transfer the right to them in their interest and for their purposes,
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and common sense did not prevent them from exercising it.That is why Blanchard and
Fischer (1989, ch. 4) argue, as long as the bank prots by issuing money, it has the
temptation to issue more until innity that causes money to lose value. As discussed in
the introduction, if not for the institutional setup of modern capitalist society (banking
credit is issued by commercial banks to the entrepreneurs to achieve creative destruction,
while money is issued by the central bank and is seldom granted to the entrepreneurs for
creative destruction), credit would be the same as money. In our pure credit economy,
we can replace credit by money and everything holds. Therefore, it is reasonable for us
to assume that there is a real demand for credit. Nevertheless, we will check the results
in situation in which there is no such a demand for credit in Section 4.3.
3.3 Free Entry into the Banking Sector
Here we study free entry into the banking system. Section 4.1 discusses no free-entry.
According to equation (12), the revenue of the banking business is D = d +   R.
Using equations (3) and (17) to substitute out d and R, respectively, we have
D = Wtl + 

1 + 
Y . (19)
Given free entry into the banking sector, the existence of the revenue from credit
ination will incentize more banks to enter the banking business. The entry of new banks
will stop when the expected prot of each bank (D
m
, where m is the number of banks in
equilibrium) equals its xed set-up cost (Wtl): Dm = Wtl. This pins down m:
mWtl = Wtl + 

1 + 
Y , (20)
where we use equation (19).
The left-hand side of equation (20) is the set-up cost for all banks, while the right-
hand side is the total revenue of the banking system. The left-hand side is easy to
interpret: each new bank has a xed setup cost, that is, each new bank needs a xed
amount of workers, l, to operate. Each worker receives a wage rateWt in the mobile labor
market. The right-hand side can be interpreted as follows. We assume that the banks
are symmetric and can coordinate without any cost. Therefore, the whole revenue of the
banks should be the same as that of a single giant bank. It equals the reservation payo¤
in the benchmark case (d = Wtl) in Section 2.3 plus the banksshare of revenue from
credit ination (R =  

1+Y ). In the steady state, free entry into the banking system
stops whenever equation (20) holds.
As shown in Sections 2.6 and 2.7, the real nal output produced, Y , is roughly a
constant fraction of 1

ptxt, where xt is the amount of intermediate good. And we have
ptxt =
1

Wtxt. Therefore,
Y
Wt
= yxt, where y is a constant. The free-entry condition of
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the banking sector in equation (20) can be simplied as
m = 1 +
yxt
(1 + ) l
. (21)
As in Section 2.5, given that all labor is used in manufacturing, research and banking
and each bank needs a xed amount of labor, l, to operate, we have x+ml+n = L. This
equation combined with equation (21) yields the number of banks as
m =
(1 + ) l +  (L  n) y
(1 + ) l + ly
. (22)
Equation (22) states that, the number of the banks (m) positively depends on either
 or . A higher bargaining power of the banks (i.e., a higher ) means the banks keep
a larger fraction of the revenue from credit ination. As the revenue from credit ination
to the banking system becomes higher, more banks will enter the intermediary service.
A higher , which comes from a lower , means a higher revenue from credit ination,
which would also cause the entry of more banks.
3.4 Research Arbitrage
Section 3.3 has shown that the banks use their share of revenue from credit ination to
employ more workers when there is free entry into the banking business. In this section
we show that the entrepreneurs would use their share of revenue from credit ination to
conduct more R&D (if it is used in increasing the nominal wage of the workers, it is similar
to consumptive credit, which is discussed in Section 4.2). Since entrepreneurs get (1  )
share of the revenue from credit ination, their prot will be the usual monopolistic prot
from innovations (the bt in equation 4) plus the extra revenue from credit ination (the
E given in equation 13). Similarly, using equations (11) and (14) to rewrite equation (13)
as E = (1 )
Y
1+ , the prot of entrepreneurship, et, becomes
et = 1  

Wtxt  Wtl + (1  )
Y
1 + 
= At!t

1  

xt   l + (1  )
y
1 + 
xt

, (23)
where y is a constant by dening Y
Wt
= yxt. Equation (23) states that the entrepreneurs
receive additional revenue from credit ination, (1  ) 
1+Y , besides the monopolistic
prot from a better quality of intermediate goods (bt) in the benchmark case.
The additional revenue from credit ination to entrepreneurship would attract more
resources into R&D, which is good for growth. The other opposing e¤ect is reected in
the decreasing of xt because more labor would be employed by the banking sector (see
Figure 6). The two opposing e¤ects underpin our story of creative destruction with credit
ination, detailed in Section 3.5.
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Combining equations (5), (6), and (23) yields the research arbitrage condition:
1 =

h 
1

  1  L ml   n  l + (1  ) 
1+y
 
L ml   ni
r + n
. (24)
3.5 The Steady-State Growth Rate and Credit Ination
The steady state growth rate is still governed by equation (10). Using equation (22) to
substitute out m in equation (24), we get the steady-state amount of research, n, as a
function of  and :
1 =

r + n

(1  ) (1 + ) +  (1  ) y
 (1 +  + y)
 
L  n  l  l (25)
Equation (25) pins down the amount of research n in steady state, which is constant.
Proposition 1 In the steady state with free-entry into the banking business, the growth
rate is an increasing function of  (the rate of credit ination) if  (the bargaining power
of the banks) is less than ; otherwise, the growth rate is a decreasing function of .
Given that  is a decreasing function of  (the semi-elasticity of credit demand with
respect to the rate of credit ination), in the former case, the growth rate is a decreasing
function of , while it is an increasing function of  in the latter case.
Proof: We have shown that the steady state growth rate is g = n ln . Since  and 
are constant structural parameters, the steady state growth rate is linear in the steady-
state amount of research, n. Therefore, the relationship between the steady state growth
rate and  will be the same as that between n and . According to equation (25), taking
the derivative of the steady-state amount of research, n, with respect to  yields
@n
@
1y (  ) , (26)
where y is a constant dened in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Equation (26) is easiest to derive
by the implicit function theorem.
Therefore, we have
@n
@
> 0 if  > ;
@n
@
< 0 if  < .
Then from equation (18) we have @n
@
< 0 if  >  and @n
@
> 0 if  < . Q.E.D.
The mechanism can be seen from equations (23) and (21). According to equation (18),
the optimal rate of credit ination is independent of the bargaining power of the banks.
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Therefore, the revenue from credit ination would be independent of the bargaining power
of the banks. An increase in the rate of credit ination, which is determined by an increase
in the semi-elasticity of real credit demand with respect to credit ination, yields larger
revenue from credit ination. This would have two opposing e¤ects on the steady state
growth. On the one hand,  share of the revenue from credit ination goes to the banks,
which would absorb more labor into the banking business. This is given in equation
(21). Therefore, fewer workers will be employed in the manufacturing sector, which yields
a lower monopolistic prot from innovations to entrepreneurs. This can be seen from
equation (23), in which the monopolistic prot of entrepreneurs increases with x, and
x is equal to the amount of labor used in manufacturing. On the other hand, (1  )
share of the revenue from credit ination goes to the entrepreneurs, which increases the
return to entrepreneurship and attracts more resources into R&D. This is captured by
the last term in equation (23). This e¤ect tends to increase the steady state amount
of research n. When  is low, the latter e¤ect dominates because the majority of the
revenue from credit ination goes to the entrepreneurs. Consequently, the steady state
growth rate would increase as the rate of credit ination increases. In contrast, when
 is high, the former e¤ect dominates because the revenue from credit ination mainly
goes to the banks, and growth would be decreasing as the rate of credit ination goes
up. This is intuitive because the credit ination would tax away some real resources from
the economy. When it is used in the banking business that competes for labor services
with the entrepreneurs, the growth would be retarded. When it is used in R&D, more
innovations would be forthcoming, which thereby yields higher steady state growth.
Equation (18) delivers @

@
< 0. That is, in countries with a higher semi-elasticity of
credit demand with respect to credit ination, the optimal rate of credit ination would
be lower. Therefore, two factors determine the steady state growth rate across countries:
the semi-elasticity of credit demand with respect to credit ination () and the bargaining
power of the banks (). A higher semi-elasticity of credit demand with respect to credit
ination would be good for growth if the banks have a higher bargaining power. This is
because when the banks have a higher bargaining power, a lower rate of credit ination
is good for growth. This is ensured by a larger , which attaches more penalties on the
banks to increase the rate of credit ination. Similarly, a higher semi-elasticity of credit
demand with respect to credit ination would be bad for growth if the banks have a lower
bargaining power. This is because when banks have a lower bargaining power a higher
rate of credit ination is desirable. A higher rate of credit ination is achieved only when
there is a lower semi-elasticity of credit demand with respect to credit ination. Other
cases can be similarly analyzed. Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 180) analyzed the role
of the elasticity of money demand in the money growth and capital accumulation nexus.
In summary, one can see that, in our model, credit ination works on growth through
the channel of productivity. Therefore, cross-country di¤erences in the rate of credit
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ination, which is in turn determined by the semi-elasticity of credit demand with respect
to credit ination, help to explain the cross-country di¤erences in growth rates. Moreover,
cross-country di¤erences in the banking structure that may a¤ect the bargaining power
of the banks (but not the rate of credit ination in our model here) would also help
to explain the cross-country di¤erences in growth rates. This is further shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the steady state with free-entry into the banking business, the growth
rate is a decreasing function of  (the bargaining power of the banks).
Proof. This is obvious given equation (25). Observing equation (18), the optimal rate
of credit ination is not a function of . Therefore, as  increases, the numerator in
equation (25) decreases while the denominator increases. Consequently, the steady state
amount of research n increases, so does the steady state growth. Q.E.D.
The mechanism can be seen from equations (24) and (18). Equation (18) shows that
the optimal rate of credit ination is independent of the bargaining power of the banks,
so is the revenue from credit ination. Therefore, a larger share of the revenue from credit
ination goes to the banks would have two e¤ects on the steady state growth, accord-
ing to equations (24). First, more labor would be absorbed into the banking business.
Therefore, fewer workers will be employed in the manufacturing sector, which yields a
lower monopolistic prot from innovations to entrepreneurs. This can be seen from equa-
tions (4) and (23), in which the monopolistic prot of entrepreneurs increases with x (the
amount of labor used in manufacturing). Second, according to equation (23), a larger
bargaining power of the banks leaves a lower fraction of the revenue from credit ination
to the entrepreneurs, which tends to decrease the return to entrepreneurship. Therefore,
both e¤ects would lower the steady state amount of research n.
In summary, we prove that creative destruction is one important channel for ination to
impact long-run growth. This is possible because ination may a¤ect the relative amount
of resources allocated to entrepreneurs. The banks can reap revenue from a higher rate of
credit growth (like seigniorage revenue), which attracts more labor into banks, decreasing
the prot of entrepreneurs and thereby growth. But when the revenue is achieved by
issuing more credit to entrepreneurs, part of the revenue goes to entrepreneurs, attracting
more resources into R&D and promoting growth. When banks retain a larger share
of the revenue, the former e¤ect dominates and credit ination retards growth. When
entrepreneurs get the larger share of the revenue, the latter e¤ect dominates and credit
ination increases growth.
3.6 The Welfare Implications of Credit Ination
The basic model is similar to Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 2), which makes the welfare
analysis much easier. To conduct the welfare analysis, we need to follow the similar
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approach in sticky-price open economy macroeconomic models (detailed in Obstfeld and
Rogo¤, 1996, p. 684). That is, we focus on the realcomponent of the representative
agents utility. This is because in equilibrium the consumption will be equal to nal output
produced to clear the market for the nal output. However, the nal output production
depends on real credit balances. Nonetheless, as long as the derived utility from real
credit balances is not too large as a share of total utility, the welfare change from the
realcomponent of the representative agents utility dominates. This is more likely with
large values of  (the semi-elasticity of real credit holding with respect to credit ination).
In the creative destruction model of Aghion and Howitt, the welfare-maximizing rate
of growth may be greater or smaller than laissez-faire economys growth (see Aghion
and Howitt, 1998, 61-63 for details). A lower rate of laissez-faire growth resulted from
credit ination (when the share of entrepreneurs is low) is welfare-improving when the
laissez-faire growth is excessive (due to excessive research when the business-stealing e¤ect
dominates), while it is welfare-decreasing when the laissez-faire growth is less than optimal
(due to too little research when the intertemporal-spillover and appropriability e¤ects
dominates). In contrast, a higher rate of laissez-faire growth generated by credit ination
(when the share of banks is low) is welfare-improving when the laissez-faire growth is
less than optimal, while the higher growth would decrease welfare when the laissez-faire
growth is already excessive.
4 Other Issues and Empirical Evidence
In this section, we study several other cases. The rst is that there is no free entry into
the banking business, which is done in Section 4.1. The second involves consumptive
credit credit issued for pure consumptive ends. This is discussed in Section 4.2. The
third investigates what will happen if there is no such a micro-founded demand function
for credit. This is analyzed in Section 4.3.
4.1 No Free Entry into the Banking Sector
When there is no free entry into the banking business, the labor market clearing condition
is x+ l + n = L. Repeating similar steps yields the equilibrium condition:
1 =

h 
1

  1  L  n  l  l + (1  ) y
1++y
i
r + n
. (27)
Equation (27) pins down the optimal amount of research n.
Proposition 3 In the steady state with no free-entry into the banking business, the growth
rate is an increasing function of  (the rate of credit ination). Given that  is a
decreasing function of  (the semi-elasticity of credit demand with respect to the rate of
credit ination), the growth rate is a decreasing function of . Moreover, the growth rate
is a decreasing function of  (the bargaining power of the banks).
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Proof. Now taking the derivative of the steady-state amount of research, n, in equation
(27) with respect to  yields @n
@ > 0. Given
@
@
< 0, we have @n
@
< 0. Because  is not
a function of , it is obvious that the growth rate is a decreasing function of . Q.E.D.
When the free entry into the banking business is not allowed, we actually eliminate
the negative e¤ect of credit ination on growth. When there is free entry into the banking
business, the revenue from credit ination that goes to the banks would absorb more labor
into the banking business. As a result, fewer workers will be employed in the manufac-
turing sector, which yields a lower monopolistic prot from innovations to entrepreneurs.
But when the free-entry into the banking business is prohibited, such an e¤ect would not
exist. Meanwhile, the revenue from credit ination that goes to the entrepreneurs would
still attract more resources into R&D. Therefore, more innovations would be forthcoming,
which thereby yields higher steady state growth. A lower semi-elasticity of credit demand
with respect to credit ination gives rise to a higher optimal rate of credit ination as
well as higher revenue from credit ination. This would promote steady state growth, as
the revenue from credit ination distributed to the entrepreneurs would also increase.
Following the arguments in Section 3.6, the higher rate of laissez-faire growth generated
by credit ination with no free entry into the banking sector would be welfare-improving
when the laissez-faire growth is less than optimal, while it decreases welfare when the
laissez-faire growth is already excessive. Therefore, when the laissez-faire growth is already
excessive, increasing the share of the banks in the revenue-from-credit-ination would yield
a lower growth, which is welfare-improving.
Although in real economies there are legal restrictions on the entry into the banking
business, the share of workers in existing banks may increase over time. Therefore, the
prediction in proposition 1 is more likely to hold in the real world.
4.2 Consumptive Credit Ination
In this section, we rst study the case in which there is only one giant bank in the economy
(i.e., there is no entry into the banking business). As argued by Schumpeter (1911, ch.
III, 114-115), banks could in principle give credits that really serve consumptive ends. If
the banks only grant credit for consumptive ends, it is evident that the entrepreneurial
activity is terminated in the economy. This is because entrepreneurs would not be able to
get the service of labor from existing intermediate good rms. This is of course due to the
fact that the banks can prevent the entrepreneurs from doing so. Otherwise, the usual
creative destruction still exists. If people totally use the credit for consumptive use, would
the bank agree to do so? The answer is yes if the banks can share the revenue from credit
ination with those who are granted the credit (this includes the extreme case that the
banks issue more credit and keep the credit themselves). Now, since there is no long-run
growth, it boils down to a Cagan (1956) model (see Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 1996, ch. 8), with
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negligible di¤erences. If some people who are granted the credit become entrepreneurs,
we will have long-run growth, although lower than that in previous sections.
If people use the credit only for consumptive ends, the situation would be even worse
when there is free entry into the banking business. More banks would strive for the
seigniorage-revenue, generating negative externalities on one another. This would result
in hyperination. As Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, p. 525) describe, a question that puzzled
Cagan is governments let money growth exceed the rate that maximizes the seigniorage-
revenue. If the commercial banks also issue credits purely for consumptive ends, the banks
together with the government compete for the seigniorage-revenue. This would also push
the government to further increase ination. A hyperination is more likely to occur.
This even helps to understand the recent subprime mortgage crisis. In developed
countries, although there are legal restrictions on the operation of banks, they may not
be su¢ cient to prevent the banks from issuing more credits in the boom period either to
more risky entrepreneurs or to consumptive uses. As consumptive credit issued by the
banks in our model is obviously bad for growth, we are concerned with risky entrepre-
neurs. First, the banks may even get a larger share of revenue from credit ination in
negotiating with risky entrepreneurs. Second, a larger share of the revenue from credit
ination to the banking sector would cause the entry of more nancial intermediaries. The
nancial intermediaries compete for the service of labor with the manufacturing sector,
further decreasing the protability of entrepreneurial innovations. It becomes less likely
the entrepreneurs can succeed in producing commodities at least equal in value to the
credit plus interest. Damped investment demand would contribute to the emergence of
a recession. This Schumpeterian growth and cycle interlink has been modeled by Fran-
cois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), although with a di¤erent mechanism. Since our model is
concerned with steady state growth, we leave the further study on the growth and cycle
interlink in one general equilibrium framework to future research. Nonetheless, we will
link our model to empirical evidence in Section 4.4.
4.3 No Micro-founded Credit Demand Function
When we study long-run growth generated by creative destruction, we already make credit
essential in the dynamic capitalist society (see Schumpeter, 1911). In other words, we do
not need a micro-founded credit demand function to introduce credit in the economy. The
fundamental role of credit in nancing entrepreneurs by creating new purchasing power
already makes credit play an essential role in nancing the development of capitalist
society, as argued by Schumpeter. We introduce a micro-founded credit demand function
in the previous sections just to set an upper limit for the banks to create new credit. Do
the banks in the capitalist society behave this way? While we leave this to future studies,
here we study what will happen if such a micro-founded credit demand function does not
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exist. Without a microfoundation for credit demand, we rely on ad hoc assumptions. The
appendix presents the detailed proof the results:
Proposition 4 In the steady state with free-entry into the banking business, when the
elasticity of  (credit ination) with respect to  (the bargaining power of the banks), ",
is positive at  = 0, the growth rate is inverted-U related to . The inverted-U shape is
skewed to the left with higher ". Given that  is monotone in , the steady-state growth
rate is also inverted-U related to .
We briey explain the economic mechanism. The steady state growth linearly depends
on the steady state amount of research n. An increase in the bargaining share of the banks
() has two opposing e¤ects on the steady state amount of research n. The rst e¤ect
tends to decrease n. All else equal, increasing the bargaining share of the banks will,
rst of all, leave a lower share to the entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurs receive a lower
prot, few resources would be devoted to research. Moreover, a larger share to the banks
means the total prot of the banking system will be higher, and more banks will enter into
the banking system. As a result, fewer workers will be employed in the manufacturing
sector, which yields a lower monopolistic prot from innovations to entrepreneurs. Taken
together, the rst e¤ect would decrease the steady state amount of research n.
The second e¤ect can be expressed, using " to denote the elasticity of  with respect
to , as ( )

", where  is the xed parameter in the nal good production function
given in equation (1). When the elasticity is positive, an increase in  will incentize the
banks to issue more credits. When  is small, entrepreneurs keep a larger share of the
revenue from credit ination, which increases the return to entrepreneurship. Therefore,
more resource will be devoted to research, which pushes up the growth rate. When  is
low, this e¤ect dominates the rst e¤ect, so growth increases with  (and ). However,
when  is very large, the revenue from credit ination would not increase much. Moreover,
a large chunk of the revenue goes to the banking sector, leaving a small share of the revenue
to entrepreneurs. The banks employ more workers, which also decreases the monopolistic
prot from innovations. Therefore, same as the rst e¤ect, the second e¤ect tends to
decrease n when  is very large, hence growth becomes a decreasing function of .
Moreover, even if our assumption that the elasticity of  with respect to , ", is
positive at low values of  does not hold, the model still predicts a negative e¤ect of
credit ination on growth. In this case, the crowding out e¤ect (that is, the banking
sector competes for the service of labor) dominates that from the extra credit-ination-
revenue to entrepreneurship. That is, the revenue from credit ination to the banking
sector causes more banks to compete for the service of labor, which leaves less labor to
manufacturing. The monopolistic prot from innovations will be lower. The decrease
in the monopolistic prot from innovations will be larger than the revenue from credit
ination to the entrepreneurs, hence growth is a decreasing function of credit ination.
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4.4 Empirical Evidence from the U.S. and China
We have briey discussed in the introduction that the mechanism that we try to formalize
in our paper is supported by important real world facts (in the two most important
countries, U.S. as the leading one, and China as the largest developing one). However,
it is worth discussing several issues in detail. First, is the mechanism that we emphasize
important in real world situations? Second, can our mechanism help to explain the stylized
empirical facts in the U.S. and in China?
First of all, as illustrated in Figures 1 to 4, the nancial sector is important in both
countries. The share of employment in the nancial sector is in the range 4.25%-4.4% in
the U.S. (see Table 1), and that in China is in the range 3.1%-3.7% (see Table 3). Given
the relative high compensation of the nancial sector, its total compensative consists of
7.3 to 7.9% of total compensation of all industries in the U.S. (see Table 2). In China,
the share is increasing over time and reaches 6.81% in 2010 (see Table 4). Therefore, the
relative amount of resources allocated to the nancial sector is large and varies over time,
which may a¤ect the relative amount of resources allocated to entrepreneurs and thereby
economic growth.
[Tables 1 to 4 Here]
Second, we show that our model can help to explain the variations of the economic
series, despite that it may not be the only explanation. The crucial linkage between the
real world facts and the model is how the monetary policies (as reected by the federal
funds rate) would a¤ect the credit expansion of the nancial sector. That is, it is crucial
to identify the parameters of our model that may be a¤ected the changing economic
environment. According to equation (18), the optimal rate of credit ination is only a
function of  (the semi-elasticity of real credit demand with respect to credit ination), a
parameter in the production function. Therefore, the optimal rate of credit ination will
not be a¤ected by the changing economic policies. Therefore, it is hard to test Proposition
1. However, we argue that lax monetary policies may make the credit expansion by the
nancial sector easier. That is, one possible parameter of our model that may be a¤ected
the changing monetary policies is the relative bargaining power of the nancial sector,
. Given Proposition 2, how  will be a¤ected by monetary policies would determine
whether our model can explain the facts.
We argue that the lax monetary policy during 2001-2003 would increase the bargaining
share of the nancial intermediaries. A larger share of the revenue from credit ination to
the banking sector would cause the entry of more nancial intermediaries. Therefore, one
can observe the increasing share of employment in the nancial sector during 2001-2003
in the U.S. in Figure 1. The nancial intermediaries compete for the service of labor
with the manufacturing sector, decreasing the protability of entrepreneurial innovations.
As the Fed gradually tightens the monetary policy in 2003, the employment share of the
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nancial sector decreases a little, but remains quite stable during 2003-2006. Although
the Fed may be concerned with the overheating of the economy and has acted accordingly,
the relative compensation of the nancial sector starts to increase in 2003 (it is decreasing
during 2001-2003) (see Figure 2). Therefore, we deem the counter-cyclical policy of the
Fed to be insu¢ cient or slow to decrease the relative bargaining power of the nancial
sector in the boom period when agents have optimistic moods.
To summarize, rst, the share of labor in the nancial sector increased during 2001-
2003 due to expansionary monetary policy. Although the employment share of the nan-
cial sector stops to increase, its relative compensation starts to increase. Therefore, the
total share of resources allocated to the nancial sector began to increase in 2003. More
shares of labor and more total resources absorbed by the nancial sector would leave fewer
resources to entrepreneurs. Economic growth would be decreased.
Moreover, with expansionary monetary policies, some credit of the nancial sector
may be issued to the consumers. As shown in Figure 7, starting in 2003, the U.S. has
experienced a large increase in subprime mortgage lending by the nancial intermediaries.
The subprime share of mortgage originations more than doubled in 2004 (from 7.9% in
2003 to 18.5% in 2004). Section 4.2 shows that consumptive credit issued by the banks is
bad for growth. This fact coupled with the fewer resources to entrepreneurs would predict
a much lower growth, as conrmed by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis.
[Figure 7 Here]
As showed in the introduction, feeling the negative impact of the subprime mortgage
crisis in 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao decided to pump 4,000 billion Yuan into the economy
starting from 2009. As argued in the U.S. case, we believe that the expansionary monetary
policies would cause the relative bargaining power of the nancial sector to increase. What
happened in the U.S. almost all happened in China. The employment share of the nancial
sector increased by 0.3 percentage points in 2009 comparing to 2007, and stayed at the
higher share. The relative wage of the nancial sector continued to increase, causing the
continuing increase of the share of total wages of the nancial sector in all industries.
China has also implemented some other policies. For example, starting from October
2008, all consumers with mortgage payments have been given the 70% discount in interest
rate comparing to 85% previously, which is still in e¤ect today. Moreover, the government
imposes various restrictions on housing transactions. China already felt the pressure of
lower rate of economic growth. For instance, China anticipates 6.99 million university
graduates nationwide in 2013, and these graduates are having problems nding a job,
reported by The Wall Street Journal China Real Time. Can China avoid a recession or
a large decrease in the rate of economic growth? It remains to be seen.
Although there are numerous explanations for the subprime mortgage crisis (we do
not cite them here), we can at least argue that our model and the mechanism that we are
emphasizing are not rejected by the U.S. and the Chinese data.
25
5 Conclusions
In this paper we propose creative destruction as the channel for ination to impact long-
run growth. Ination may a¤ect the relative amount of resources allocated to entrepre-
neurs. The banks can reap revenue from a higher rate of credit growth, which attracts
more labor into banks, decreasing the prot of entrepreneurs and thereby growth. But
when the revenue is achieved by issuing more credit to entrepreneurs, part of the revenue
goes to entrepreneurs, attracting more resources into R&D and promoting growth. When
banks retain a larger share of the revenue, the former e¤ect dominates and credit ination
retards growth. When entrepreneurs get the larger share of the revenue, the latter e¤ect
dominates and credit ination increases growth. When the revenue is achieved by issuing
more consumptive credit, growth will be retarded.
A lower rate of laissez-faire growth resulted from credit ination (when the share of
entrepreneurs is low) is welfare-improving when the laissez-faire growth is excessive (due
to excessive research when the business-stealing e¤ect dominates), while it is welfare-
decreasing when the laissez-faire growth is less than optimal (due to too little research
when the intertemporal-spillover and appropriability e¤ects dominate). In contrast, a
higher rate of laissez-faire growth generated by credit ination (when the share of banks
is low) is welfare-improving when the laissez-faire growth is less than optimal, while the
higher growth decreases welfare when the laissez-faire growth is already excessive.
We also show that our model helps to explain the stylized facts in the U.S. during
2001-2007 and those in China during 2003-2011. Although it may not be the whole story,
the mechanism  ination can a¤ect the relative amount of resources allocated to the
entrepreneurs and thereby impact creative destruction is important and helpful for us
to appreciate the recent stylized facts in the U.S. and in China. We leave the rigorous
quantifying of the importance of the mechanism to future work.
Appendix. No Micro-founded Credit Demand Function
A.1 The Benchmark Model
The nal output production function would not depend on real credit demand. In the bench-
mark model, the existence of a single bank needs a xed amount of labor to operate. The bank
grants the credit in the amount of ptxt to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneurs use the credit
to hire workers at the wage rate Wt. Total wage bill is Wtlt = Wtxt. The sales of intermediate
good is ptxt =
1

Wtlt. This monopolistic prot less the service payment to the bank, bt = 
1

  1Wtlt  Wtl, would be used to buy the R&D input. The nal goods rm buys inter-
mediate good in the amount of ptxt. Then it produces nal output Atxt =
1

ptxt. The nal
goods rm has a prot in the amount of
 
1

  1 ptxt, that is distributed to the households by
banks issuing the same amount of credit to the representative worker. The amount of total bank
credit in the economy includes the credit granted to the entrepreneurs (ptxt) and the lump-sum
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transfer of credit from the banks to the workers in the amount of
 
1

  1 ptxt. The whole credit
is 1

ptxt. The nal output is Atxt . Therefore, the price level in the economy is
1

ptxt
Atxt
= 1.
A.2 The Dynamically Consistent Rate of Credit Ination
The banks and the entrepreneurs share the revenue from the credit ination according to costless
Nash Bargaining, with the share to the banks and the entrepreneurs being  and (1  )
respectively. We assume that the whole amount of credit issued is proportional to nal output
(which is Ax ). That is, we assume that the banks, besides the original Ax

 amount of credit,
issue an extra Ax amount of credit. Therefore, the price level increase to (1 + ) from the
original level of 1. The revenue from credit ination is also Ax .
Now suppose  is chosen in steady state. That is,  is dynamically consistent. In steady
state, xt remains constant at x and At grows at the rate of g. Given the constant rate of time
preference r that equals the interest rate, the banks would get a discounted life-time revenue
from credit ination as
P1
0
(1+g)
(1+r)
A0x = 1+rr g
A0x > 0 (the interest rate is larger
than the growth rate, which generally holds in endogenous growth models). In a dynamically
inconsistent situation, the banks would let  go to innity, in which case the banks can get one-
period revenue from credit ination. In the following periods, people would not accept credit
and we revert to a commodity economy. The limit revenue from credit ination that the banks
can get is A0x. Therefore, as long as
1+r
r g
A0x > A0x, that is,  >
r g
1+r
, the banks
would always choose , which is dynamically consistent in steady state.
Any  with r g
1+r
<  < 1 can be supported as a steady state. In contrast, in Section 3
there is a demand function for credit. Then higher ination would cause lower demand for real
credit, acting as a penalty for the banks to issue more credit. This yields a revenue-maximizing
rate of credit ination. Here without a demand function for credit, to pin down , we ad hocly
assume that the amount of credits issued by the banks and thereby the rate of credit ination
positively depends on the banksbargaining power (share), : @
@
> 0. Therefore, there is a
bijective mapping between  and . Unlike Section 3.2 in which  is uniquely pinned down by
, here  is uniquely pinned down by .
A.3 Free Entry into the Banking Sector and the Labor Market
Now the free entry condition of the banking system becomes
Wtl =
Atx

t
m  1 , (28)
which pins down the number of banks (m) in the economy. The free-entry condition of the
banking sector can be simplied as
m = 1 +
lt+1
2l
. (29)
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Equation (29) states that, the number of banks, m, positively depends on the revenue from
credit ination to the banking sector. The higher bargaining power the banks (i.e., a higher
), the more credits the banks would issue to the entrepreneurs (given @
@
> 0). Then the
revenue from credit ination of the banking system will be higher. More banks will enter into
the banking business until equation (29) holds.
Given that all labor is used in manufacturing, research and banking, we have x+n+ml = L.
This equation combined with equation (29) yields the number of banks, which increases with
either  or , as
m =
2l +  (L  n)
2l + l
. (30)
A.4 Research Arbitrage and Steady-state Growth
Now the prot of entrepreneurs, considering Atxt =
1
2
Wtlt, will be
bt = 1  

Wtxt  Wtl + (1  )Atxt = At!t

1  

xt   l + (1  )
2
lt+1

, (31)
which says that, the entrepreneurs receive additional revenue from credit ination, (1  )Atxt ,
besides the usual monopolistic prot from a better quality of intermediate good.
Repeating similar steps yields the research arbitrage condition:
1 =

h 
1

  1  L ml   n  l + (1 )
2
 
L ml   ni
r + n
. (32)
The steady state growth rate is still g = n ln , which is linear in the amount of research
n. Using equation (30) to substitute out m in equation (32), we get the steady-state amount of
research, n, as a function of  and :
1 =

r + n

 (1  ) + (1  )
2 + 
 
L  l   n  l (33)
Proposition 4. In the steady state with free-entry into the banking business, when the
elasticity of  (credit ination) with respect to  (the bargaining power of the banks),
", is positive at  = 0, the growth rate is inverted-U related to . The inverted-U shape
is skewed to the left with higher ". Given that  is monotone in , the steady-state
growth rate is also inverted-U related to .
Proof: First, we have already shown that the relationship between the steady state growth
rate and  is the same as that between n and . According to equation (33), taking the
derivative of the steady-state amount of research, n, with respect to  yields
@n
@
1@
@
 (  )   (+ ) (34)
28
Therefore, we have
@n
@
j=0 = 
2


"j=0   (+ ) 
2

=
2

"j=0 (35)
@n
@
j=11@
@
 (  1)   (+ ) < 0. (36)
Therefore, @n
@
j=0 > 0 as long as @@ j=0 > (r g)[(1+r)+r g]2(1+r) . The last inequality uses the
fact that as  approaches 0,  approaches its lower limit, r g
1+r
. We denote the elasticity of 
with respect to  when  = 0 as "j=0. Therefore, as long as "j=0 is greater than 0,
@n
@
j=0 > 0. Given this condition, n is inverted-U related to , so is the steady-state growth
rate. Using equation (34), a higher "u makes the zenith point of the inverted-U shape emerge
at a larger value of  (i.e., the inverted-U shape is skewed to the left). Last, given that @
@
> 0,
the steady-state growth rate is also inverted-U related to . Q.E.D.
The economic mechanism is presented in Section 4.3. Even if the assumption that the
elasticity of  with respect to , " , is positive at low values of  does not hold, the model still
predicts a negative e¤ect of credit ination on growth. The explanation is given in Section 4.3.
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Table 1: Share of Employee in Finance and Insurance and Federal Funds E¤ective Rate (U.S.)
Full-time and Part-time Employees (Thousands) Share of Employee in Federal Funds
All Industries Finance and Insurance Finance and Insurance (%) E¤ective Rate (%)
2001 137522 5843 4.25 3.88
2002 136578 5853 4.29 1.67
2003 136293 5950 4.37 1.13
2004 137812 5973 4.33 1.35
2005 139770 6067 4.34 3.22
2006 142241 6193 4.35 4.97
2007 143774 6159 4.28 5.02
Sources: Employee: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDPbyInd_VA_NAICS_1998-2011_USA.
Federal Funds Rate: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (H.15).
Table 2: Relative and Total Compensation of Finance and Insurance in the U.S.
Compensation of Employees Share of Compensation of Relative Compensation
(Millions of Dollars) Finance&Insurance (%) between Finance&Insurance
All Industries Finance and Insurance and All Industries
2001 5984534 442301 7.39 1.74
2002 6116389 447316 7.31 1.71
2003 6388293 467333 7.32 1.68
2004 6699555 497375 7.42 1.71
2005 7071450 541799 7.66 1.77
2006 7483609 584420 7.81 1.79
2007 7862992 610276 7.76 1.81
Notes and Sources: Relative compensation is calculated as follows. We rst divide compensation of
employees in Table 2 by the number of full-time and part-time employees in Table 1. Then we calculate
the relative compensation. Source: U.S. BEA: GDPbyInd_VA_NAICS_1998-2011_USA.
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Table 3: Share of Employee in Finance and Growth Rate of M2 in China
Employment in Urban Units (10 Thousands) Share of Employee in Annual Growth Rate
All Industries Finance Finance (%) of M2 (%)
2003 10969.7 353.3 3.22 19.58
2004 11098.9 356.0 3.21 14.67
2005 11404.0 359.3 3.15 17.57
2006 11713.2 367.4 3.14 16.95
2007 12024.4 389.7 3.24 16.74
2008 12192.5 417.6 3.42 17.82
2009 12573.0 449.0 3.57 27.68
2010 13051.5 470.1 3.60 19.73
2011 14413.3 505.3 3.51 13.61
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (2012) (Tables 4-5 and 19-4).
Table 4: Relative and Total Compensation of Finance in China
Total Wages of Employees Share of Wages of Relative Wage
(100 Millions of Yuan) Finance (%) between Finance
All Industries Finance and All Industries
2003 15329.6 734.4 4.79 1.49
2004 17615.0 866.7 4.92 1.53
2005 20627.1 1047.7 5.08 1.61
2006 24262.3 1292.9 5.33 1.70
2007 29471.5 1670.3 5.67 1.78
2008 35289.5 2202.9 6.24 1.87
2009 40288.2 2658.8 6.60 1.87
2010 47269.9 3219.0 6.81 1.92
2011 59954.7 4007.0 6.68 1.94
Notes and Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (2012) (Tables 4-13 and 4-15).
Relative wage is calculated using Table 4-15 that presents the average wage of
each industry.
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Figure 1. Federal Funds Rate Decrease and U.S. Financial Sector Employment Expansion
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Figure 2. Compensation Share and Relative Compensation of the U.S. Financial Sector
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Figure 3. Chinas Monetary Expansion and the Financial Sector Employment Expansion
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Figure 4. Wage Share and Relative Wage of the Chinese Financial Sector
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Figure 7. Federal Funds Rate Decrease and U.S. Subprime Lending Expansion
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